By Chris Zambelis
Much has been said of Africas growing strategic significance. Stereotypical images of war, poverty, social and political instability, ethnic and sectarian strife, drought and disease may, for good reason, continue to color perceptions of the continent.
Yet Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, is also drawing attention as a center of economic growth and as a battleground for foreign investors keen on tapping some of the worlds most quickly expanding markets. Amid sluggish demand in the West and elsewhere due to the global financial meltdown, Africa is being touted for its unrealized economic potential and business opportunities.
Africas abundance of vital natural resources such as oil and natural gas, as well as its boasting of critical minerals and metals, has already attracted a queue of suitors offering up billions of investment dollars. Rising consumerism across the continent has also convinced previously skeptical investors that Africas potential extends beyond the traditionally volatile commodities markets.
The diplomatic, economic, energy and security inroads made by Asian powerhouses led by China in Africa in recent years is emblematic of Africas growing prominence. Once relegated to the status of a backwater in US strategic thinking, the United States has also thrown its hat into the ring in the battle for influence in Africa; the establishment of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007 reflects the growing importance of Africa to US foreign policy.
While the defense of growing US energy interests and security concerns revolving around counter-terrorism underlie AFRICOMs mission, its creation also signifies an effort on the part of the United States to check Chinas moves on the continent.
Another player in the new African "Great Game" – albeit to a lesser but still important degree – that has received far less attention is Iran.
Political intrigue and subterfuge
Irans activities in Africa made headlines in dramatic fashion when Nigerian customs authorities announced that they had impounded 13 containers of weapons on October 26, 2010, transported by a private Iranian firm to the port of Apapa in Lagos.
Having refuted initial reports suggesting that the arms shipment, which was valued at around US$20 million and included mortars, grenades, shells, rockets and ammunition, was intended for the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, a rebel group waging a violent campaign against the Nigerian state, the recently dismissed Iranian foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki acknowledged the delivery, but emphasized that the "defensive and conventional weapons" were destined for "another West African country".
The incident caused a diplomatic row between Abuja and Tehran. The Iranian ambassador to Nigeria was summoned over the incident. A friendly international football match between the national clubs of Nigeria and Iran scheduled to take place on November 17, 2010 in Tehran was cancelled. Since the arms shipment may have breached United Nations sanctions on Iran, Nigeria also threatened to raise the issue at the United Nations Security Council.
Details surrounding the incident remain mired in confusion and mystery. Subsequent reports emerged indicating that the arms were headed to the tiny Republic of the Gambia (separate bills of lading indicating that the shipment was destined for both Nigeria and Gambia eventually surfaced).
Nigerian officials have also charged two Iranian men they accuse of belonging to Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps - the Islamic Republics pre-eminent military and intelligence force - along with three Nigerian accomplices in connection with the case, with attempting to ship the arms to Gambia.
At first glance, Gambia would seem an unlikely destination for Iranian arms. Save for a sliver of coastal territory on the Atlantic Ocean, most of the country - territorially the smallest on Africas continental mainland - is located within the borders of Senegal. For its part, Senegal has been combating an insurgency in its southern region of Casamance led by the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MDFC), a rebel group agitating for independence.
The situation in Casamance (which shares a border with Gambia) has long been a source of tensions between Gambia and Senegal. Led by president Yahya Jammeh, Gambia - officially an advocate of a peaceful resolution to the conflict between Senegal and the MDFC - is accused by Senegal of providing moral and material support to the Casamance rebellion.
In an apparent attempt to distance itself from the incident, Gambia cut relations with Iran in November. Senegal, believing that the arms were destined for the rebels in Casamance via its Gambian rivals, followed suit by recalling its ambassador to Tehran in December.
Complicating matters further is the fact that up until now Tehran has cultivated friendly diplomatic and economic ties with both countries; frequent high-level contacts, growing trade and business links and transfers of Iranian development aid and technological expertise have characterized Irans relationship with Gambia and Senegal - two majority Muslim countries - in recent years.
Iran has denied any nefarious motives behind its activities in the region. Iran has instead implicated hostile intelligence agencies such as those operated by the United States and Israel in the controversy in what would represent a possible attempt to undermine its standing in Africa and the international community.
Another possible explanation offered by some observers is that the arms shipment may have had nothing at all to do with Africa. The intended recipients of the delivery, according to this theory, may have been Irans allies Hezbollah in Lebanon, with Nigeria and possibly other countries in the region serving as transshipment hubs for the Middle East.
Whatever the truth of the intended destination of the arms shipment, Iran, a longstanding and open supporter of Hezbollah, may have an interest in pushing the Hezbollah angle in order to preserve its relations with Africa. The countries impacted by the crisis may be livid over their territories being used potentially as transshipment points for arms deliveries to the Middle East or elsewhere by Iran. But an Iranian acknowledgment that the arms were intended for its allies in the Middle East may be easier to explain away from a diplomatic perspective.
Expanding horizons
Irrespective of the outcome of the tumult surrounding the arms shipment, recent events in West Africa paint a sensationalized picture of Irans activities on the continent.
Combining elements of diplomatic soft power in the form of calls to jointly bolster South-South unity and resistance against foreign imperialism with tangible actions in the trade, business and aid sectors, Irans venture into Africa fits a recent pattern of its foreign policy that has witnessed it nurture relations with countries outside of the greater Middle East.
The elevation of Africa in Irans strategic thinking was displayed by its hosting of a two-day Iran-Africa summit in Tehran on September 14-15, 2010. The event brought heads of state, diplomats, business leaders and cultural representatives from over 40 African nations to Iran to discuss a range of issues.
During his opening address at the summit, Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad highlighted what he described as the "rich culture, a history full of ups and downs, and an aspiration for a bright future for the human kind" shared by Iran and Africa. The Iranian president also called for a world order based on "respect for nations rights and dignity" and added that he believes that there is "no limit" to the potential for relations between Iran and Africa.
Iran has also committed itself to directly engaging Africans on African soil over the past few years. Ahmadinejads ambitious travel schedule has taken him to Senegal, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Mali, Nigeria, Djibouti, Comoros, Kenya, Sudan, Algeria and Gambia. Iran has also dispatched ministerial-level delegations to cement ties with other key countries on the continent, including South Africa, Angola and Ghana.
The Islamic Republic has also tried its hand in multilateral diplomacy on issues impacting Africa. Iran offered to mediate a solution to the border dispute between Chad and Sudan, its closest ally in Africa, in February 2008. An Iranian delegation was dispatched to Brussels in April 2009 to attend the Somalia donor conference hosted by the European Union (EU) and co-sponsored by the United Nations and African Union.
Iran engaged the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in August 2010, a regional development organization made up of East African countries, to discuss the situation in Somalia.
As it goes to great lengths to soften the revolutionary aspects of its Shiite Islamic identity and politics, Iran does not shy away from showcasing its Muslim character in its dealings with Muslim countries and communities on the continent.
Iranian religious foundations have established close ties with Shiite minorities in countries such as Senegal and Nigeria and have hosted African students to study Islam in the Islamic Republic. Iranian Shiite groups have also maintained friendly contacts with their Sunni counterparts, who comprise the majority of African Muslims, across Africa.
Ultimately, however, it is Irans success in positioning itself as a symbol of popular struggle and social justice in the developing world through a discourse reminiscent of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) - of which Iran is a member - that has resonated so well across Africa.
Irans mark on Africa is all the more noteworthy considering that it has historically enjoyed a marginal presence in the region.
Incidentally, Iran has also carved a niche for itself as the leader of the so-called "resistance axis" in the Middle East, a group that includes Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine and, at times, Turkey and Qatar, against the American-led regional order comprised of Israel and pro-US Arab autocracies such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
Trade and other forms of economic cooperation between Iran and Africa are also heating up. In 2007, for example, Irans largest automobile manufacturer Khodro inaugurated a production plant in Senegal. In that same year, Khodro agreed to a $2 billion deal to furnish Gambia with buses and heavy commercial vehicles.
In 2008, Iran committed to share nuclear technology with Nigeria to help support its efforts to expand its capacity to generate electricity. In 2010, Iran inked a number of agreements with the Central African Republic (CAR) and Tanzania that outline its commitment to support agriculture and critical infrastructure projects in both countries.
During his April 2010 visit to Zimbabwe, Ahmadinejad visited an Iranian textile factory in Harare and issued the opening remarks to kick off Zimbabwes annual international trade fair with calls to boost business ties between Iran and Zimbabwe. Iran and Kenya also broached the possibility of establishing a free-trade agreement following talks in October 2010.
Diplomatic proxy wars
Overall, the impetus for Irans drive into Africa is grounded in pragmatism and its current geopolitical predicament; Irans objective is to shore up its diplomatic position in the midst of threats ranging from ongoing isolation to outright invasion by the United States and Israel over its nuclear program.
Irans partners in Africa, for instance, including many key US allies, tend to vocally support its right to develop its nuclear program. Iran also wants to circumvent the intricate web of economic sanctions imposed on it by the United States and, increasingly, the international community, by exploiting new business in Africa.
As it is labeled a threat to global peace and stability, it is Iran that feels under siege; from a geographic perspective, the US-led invasions and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan combined with the existing constellation of American military bases and US naval assets in the Gulf have hemmed Iran in.
Despite US efforts to widen its footprint in Africa, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and other foreign policy priorities are weighing heavily in Washington. The domestic economic situation is also preoccupying the White House with matters closer to home. The confluence of these circumstances has provided Iran with an opening to keep pace with US gains in Africa.
Iran is also determined to counter the diplomatic and economic activities of its rival Israel across the continent. Israel has a history of strong diplomatic, economic and security relations with Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa. The Iran-Israel rivalry played itself out in Mauritania when Iran praised Mauritanias decision to sever relations with Israel in March 2010.
Mauritania - one of only three Arab states to have established formal diplomatic relations with Israel - first cut ties with Israel after its invasion of Gaza. Iran also sees an opportunity to counter Egypt, another rival with a long tradition of relations with Africa. Once a figurehead of the NAM and a diplomatic powerhouse in Africa, the Middle East and beyond, todays Egypt is a shell of its former self.
What remains of Egypts diminished international standing, much to the regret of most Egyptians, rests on its staunchly pro-US orientation. Egypts failure to secure its interests in the ongoing dispute over the distribution of Nile River waters and the eventual secession of southern Sudan, among other things, has provided Iran with an opening to project its power in Egypts backyard.
Conclusion
As Africas stock rises, Iran is poised to continue to spread its influence across the continent. Despite its impressive gains to date, Iran cannot match the inroads made by other major players angling for influence in Africa, namely the United States and China. Iran can nevertheless strengthen its hand in its confrontation with its foes by interjecting itself into African affairs. Tehrans new interest in Africa, however, is not fleeting. It follows that Iran has much to gain by engaging Africa down the road.
Chris Zambelis is an author and researcher with Helios Global, Inc, a risk management group based in the Washington, DC area. He specializes in Middle East politics. The views expressed here are the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of Helios Global, Inc. |
