The Obama administration made a ghastly error of judgment by sponsoring the media ‘leak’ threatening Pakistan with cutoff in military assistance unless the Haqqani Network is reined in. So far the bluff has cost three American lives. The toll may rise in the coming days and weeks.

The US tends to believe in its propaganda that the Afghan security forces have acquitted themselves well in the period since the American troops pulled out from ‘combat role’. Whereas, the ground reality is that the Taliban have not been in full cry so far — and that may be about to change now.

Of course, the story becomes incomplete if the ongoing siege of Kunduz City or the virtual Taliban takeover in Faryab province are overlooked, where the Afghan government forces are in palpable retreat, notwithstanding the bragging by the Uzbek warlord Rashid Dostum.

Indeed, Washington know all these months that the Haqqani Network is intact. So, why did it choose to raise dust now? The US’ diktat on the Haqqanis at this point is a blatant interference in the internal affairs of the Taliban when its transition of leadership appears to be delicately poised.

Washington cannot hope to dictate the new line-up of Taliban leadership. Pakistan assesses for some good reasons of its own that the surge of the Haqqani Network as the ‘steel frame’ within the Taliban’s leadership is an imperative need.

Indeed, the Haqqani Network is by far the best-organized single entity within the Taliban with military capability to spearhead the insurgency at a sensitive juncture when there is disorientation within the ranks of insurgent commanders.

Pakistan seems confident of its capacity to influence the Haqqani Network and estimates that its national security interests are best served if the Haqqanis gained ascendancy in southern Afghanistan bordering the Durand Line.

Paradoxically, if some day a ceasefire materializes, Haqqani Network would perform the pivotal role in the implementation of any understanding reached. The history of insurgencies the world over shows that a peace deal ultimately has to be workable on the ground, and that can happen only if groups with muscle power are involved.

There is no alternative to a political solution to the Afghan problem. The US’ marginalization in the recent Afghan peace process should not really irritate the Washington establishment at this point, since the overriding priority today ought to be regional security and stability.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to the US in October offers a splendid opportunity to put the Afghan peace talks back on track. And, conceivably, that seems to be President Barack Obama’s intention, too, since his presidential legacy on the Afghan war will be written in another year’s time thereafter.

On the contrary, the Obama administration will be biting more than it can chew if it is under the illusion that it can confront the Pakistani military and the Haqqani Network at this late hour. It is unrealistic to resort to pressure tactic when the other party simply cannot afford to back down.