Alas, Hua spoke too soon. As it turned out, in the lengthy Conference Call by the two senior US officials accompanying President Barack Obama to the G8 summit meeting in Northern Ireland — it doesn’t need much ingenuity to identify them — it is apparent that their president put together the Doha talks with the robust help of Germany, Norway and UK.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai, on the other hand, thinks — rightly so — the proposed talks are neither “Afghan-led” nor “Afghan-owned” but in reality are US-controlled; and, of course, Russian Foreign Ministry entirely agrees with Karzai. 

Even Islamabad seems hedging. The intriguing thing is whether Hua made the faux pas with a purpose or whether it was a Freudian slip. But then, she read out a statement with deliberation, which was crafted by the “Afghan hands” in Beijing. 

Obviously, it is a statement that would gladden the hearts of the US officials — that Beijing is supportive and appreciative of the brilliant work done by them in finally getting Mullah Omar’s aides to the negotiating table to discuss a truce. 

Beijing is being manifestly helpful on an issue, which is critical to Obama’s presidency. Following the North Korea problem, Afghanistan becomes the second international issue where Beijing hopes to be on the same page as Washington. It revives the spirit of the California summit — after all the unpleasantness that Edward Snowden created. 

However, in intrinsic terms, too, Beijing’s stance on the Taliban’s reconciliation is a many-splendoured thing. It is a stance distilled purely out of China’s self-interest and devoid of any principle or high ideals or concerns for regional security. 

Simply put, Beijing has concluded that the US-Pakistan-Taliban axis could be the winning thing and it is in China’s interest to be with the winning side. 

Put differently, Beijing is factoring in the return of the Taliban to Afghanistan’s power structure. It may take newer forms in comparison with the outright Pakistani invasion in the mid-1990s but as the Chinese see it, the Taliban are returning and the wise thing to do is to begin cultivating them as the future rulers of Afghanistan. 

Of course, China has big economic stakes in Afghanistan. It hopes to corner a hefty share of Afghanistan’s vast mineral wealth and just as China cultivated the Watan Group during the Karzai era, there is need to build bridges with the Taliban. Being early in the game helps, always, in securing business. 

This is one thing. Again, assuming the US does establish the nine military bases in Afghanistan, it is all the more important that China consolidates its political influence in Kabul. 

Indeed, Beijing and the Taliban go a long way and they are by no means strangers. The all-weather friendship with Pakistan surely helps China, as Islamabad will never instigate the Taliban to subvert Xinjiang. But in such matters of national security, it is always best to deal directly with the principals. 

Thus, all said, China is securing its interests under all conceivable circumstances. Hua’s statement underscores the pragmatic thinking in Beijing. Unlike Russia, China doesn’t lose sleep over Islamism. In the ultimate analysis, it remains confident it can finesse the Taliban as partners in joint enterprises that can be very rewarding to both sides. 

The Foreign Policy magazine has an insightful piece on the curious ways in which the Chinese mind could be working as regards the Afghan endgame. Read it here.