Zelin also highlighted the need to reform and modernize the VVS to deal with any local conflicts on Russia′s periphery.

While much of what Zelin said related to the development of future platforms and their procurement by the VVS, he said little about what the government and top brass plan in the meantime.

Zelin said the air force reform will be carried out in three stages, as it progresses towards a "permanent readiness" force by 2020. This will focus on adding personnel, equipping them with the necessary weapons and hardware, and improving pilot training. He argued during a press conference in Moscow on August 11 that given the currently undermanned levels of VVS units, the air force cannot adequately fulfill tasks within a set time scale. Therefore, he said, "We are now going back to our Soviet-era practice."

Some elements of Zelin′s statements were in fact quite odd, such as his admission that by 2025 the air force will not be capable of adequately conducting operations in support of a local war, despite 17 years of "modernization".

New priorities

On August 12, he elaborated on the upheaval that the reform agenda will bring to the air force. In setting up the Novvy Oblik (New Look) armed forces, he said the air force and air defense armies will be axed, giving way to new commands.

"The operational-strategic command of the air-and-space defense and the operational commands of long-range aviation and military-transport aviation, as well as the air force and air defense commands, have been included into the future combat composition of the air force," he said.

The new organizational structure of the VVS will resemble closely the structure and composition of functional groups in wartime combat management. Zelin noted that aviation bases and brigades of the air-and-space defense units will be subordinated to the commands as tactical combined units.

Zelin also claimed that in addition to these structural changes, more than half the VVS will be equipped with new or modernized aviation, while modern helicopters will account for a significant portion of the force. He said the VVS is receiving improved MiG-29s, MiG-31s, and Su-27 aircraft and that this will continue.

It is now awaiting the final testing of Kamov Ka-52 "alligator" helicopters, and Zelin said others are being developed on the basis of the Mi-8 and Mi-26. He stressed a design emphasis on light helicopters with around a 1,000 kilogram lift capacity.

In relation to the aging strategic bomber fleet, he suggested that by 2015 one third of all aircraft will be modernized. The long-range bomber Tu-22M3, further developed as a deterrent against local wars and regional conflicts, will also be upgraded. "Due to its high flight standards, it will use various methods and tactics while working on ground and surface targets in a wide range of flight regimes," Zelin said.

"The prospect of its further modernization involves a deep renewal of its avionics systems and the availability of smart weapons, based on guided air-to-surface bombs and missiles," the general said. By 2015, 60% of the Il-76 military-transport aircraft, which will account for about 70% of the entire military-transport aircraft fleet, will also be modernized. They will have improved navigation and communications equipment and a longer service life.

During his press conferences, Zelin was clearly more comfortable in talking about "future" air force development, deflecting attention from its urgency.

Procurement from abroad?

Since November 2008, Russian aircraft repair plants have under the control of "Oboronservis", which oversees the work of nine defense companies. The rationale behind this "optimization" was to free the Defense Ministry from "activities outside its area of responsibility" and to negate the impact of corruption among military officials.

All repair and maintenance is at present overseen by an Oboronservis affiliate, OAO Aviaremont. Consequently, the maintenance and repair of air force hardware is the responsibility of a commercial company whose main concern is to maximize profits - not raise operational capabilities.

In this context, Zelin seemed particularly sensitive over the issue of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV′s), which he said must remain the responsibility of the VVS. But clearly there are problems surrounding their domestic development and procurement in sufficient numbers. Contracts for UAV′s have been agreed with Israel, and he did not rule out seeking to procure more from foreign suppliers. Zelin suggested that the Russian defense industries will able to supply the VVS with advanced UAV′s by 2011.

On August 12, Zelin went into greater detail on the troubled fifth generation fighter - the Su-34, which he said was equal to two Su-27′s. Its maiden flight will take place "in November, or maybe December".

"I think that this year we will take the aircraft into the air," said Zelin, confirming that three fifth-generation jets had already been built, with the construction of a flying model already completed.

The Su-34, he said, will feature a "highly-intellectualized board, a circular information field and an all-angle field of fire", and that it will be capable of destroying both air and ground targets in all weather conditions, in the day or at night. The Su-34, said Zelin, will be highly maneuverable and capable of flying at low speeds and high angles of attack and of sustaining supersonic speeds for long periods.

He said it will also be able to use landing strips as short as 300-400 meters for takeoff and landing, and feature low optical, infrared and radar signatures, "qualitatively new electronic equipment and maximum automation of flight processes", and "high flight efficiency and safety". However, Zelin said state trials will only begin in 2015, and he offered no comment on the timescale for introducing the aircraft in larger numbers into the VVS.

In reality, new equipment is simply not reaching the VVS in any significant quantity. Despite the high ideals offered by the reform agenda, it is clear that the VVS has made little tangible progress since its poor showing in the five-day war with Georgia in August 2008.

That conflict exposed the overall ineffectiveness of an aging and cumbersome conventional force; the VVS losses notoriously included Tu-22M3 bomber sent on a reconnaissance mission staffed by a training crew, in the absence of sufficient trained pilots.

Zelin, however, demonstrated a curious penchant for a revisionist reinterpretation of VVS failings in the war, even suggesting that its losses were not to be blamed on the air force. Zelin also wanted to stress his intention to preserve army aviation under VVS control.

Many challenges

The serial production of basic aircraft types for Russian military aviation needs has almost ceased since the early 1990s. This is compounded by problems within the Russian defense industries, and consequently a host of inter-related issues has beset the repair and maintenance of aircraft. Senior commanders report that no more than 30% of aircraft are operational. Shortages in spare parts are severe, and this is also apparent in the lack of equipment for operating and maintaining airfields, as well as the necessary numbers of drivers and technicians to service such equipment.

The lack of high-precision ordnance - air-launched cruise missiles (KRVP) and dirigible bombs - has been largely overlooked in favor of looking forward to a day when "modernization" will bring better times for the VVS. Indeed, the munitions arsenal of the air force has witnessed little improvement in the past decade. Long-range forces are equipped with Kh-55 and Kh-55SM cruise missiles that were developed in the early 1970s and mostly built in the 1980s and 1990s.

The standard-issue heavy ordnance in tactical aviation (which accounts for most of the VVS inventory) comprises free-fall bombs, and rockets designed and manufactured in the 1970s.

Moreover, Zelin said Russian air force pilots at present fly an average of 60-70 hours annually, which represents an improvement on the lower standards of the 1990s but is less than half the North Atlantic Treaty Organization minimum of 180 hours, which is often much higher within many of the member states′ air forces. The reduction in the numbers of flight personnel and improved fuel supplies has contributed to this higher figure.

Zelin admitted that young lieutenants currently fly an average of 20-30 hours annually, while they are faced with the prospect of serving in remote bases on no more than 15,000-20,000 rubles (US$628) annually.

On June 5, chief of the general staff Army-General Nikolai Makarov said at a press conference in Moscow: "Now we will have as many aviators as is allowed for by the amount of operational equipment. Then we will be able to give these aviators 200-220 hours of flying time per year, as is the case with air force pilots in leading nations. We are bringing 100% of our units to permanent readiness, instead of the former 17%." Judging from Zelin′s comments, the VVS is certainly several years away from achieving these improved standards.

Back to the future?

The VVS underwent large-scale systemic structural reform in the late 1990s, yet today the air force is still confronted with the challenge of modernizing its aging platforms and procuring new aircraft. Zelin′s recent public comments, while offering some inconsistencies and apparent slips from the Defense Ministry line on reform, largely serve to indicate that generally in the effort to reform the armed forces the focus is currently on personnel, rather on than the hugely expensive issue of modernization.

This more expensive process seems likely to commence around 2011-12. In the meantime, there is a gap opening in Western and Russian understanding of these processes underway in the Russian air force, since the sources either reveal the mantra of the disaffected (retired officers) criticizing the reform agenda, or the unrealistic assertions of the service commander.

The VVS now faces the prospect of 11 years of reform and modernization, with all its inherent upheaval, change and being led by a commander who doubts whether it will emerge better equipped to conduct operations in a future local conflict.

Roger N McDermott is an honorary senior fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent at Canterbury (UK) specializing in defense and security issues in Russia, Central Asia and the South Caucasus